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The objective of this paper is to document, assess and characterize the role Ghana’s agriculture 
has played as a safety net when the urban labor market suffered economic shocks. The study 
explores how agriculture influences non-agricultural dependent households. Specific attention is 
given to the implicit value of the informal insurance role that rural households play in supporting 
family  members  who  lose  jobs  acquired  after  migrating  to  urban  areas.  The  paper  analyses 
Ghanaian agriculture’s social security role in the late 1980s and 1990s. This well documented 
period in Ghanaian economic literature, coincides with both natural and macro policy shocks and 
the policy measures taken to cope with the shocks. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Between 1980 and 2000, Ghana suffered a series of severe internal and external shocks. Table 1 
presents these crises and their impact on welfare indicators. The shocks include adverse terms of 
trade shocks, exchange rate upheavals, large budget deficits, bush fires and droughts. The 1981-83 
drought also caused the and worst energy and power crisis in the country’s history. A power crisis 
resurfaced in  1997-98.  Ghana  is  heavily  dependent  on  hydropower  for  energy  generation and 
during  both  periods  energy  dependent  firms  and  enterprises  scaled  back  operations,  shedding 
labor. 































































































































Table 1  Some Macroeconomic crisis indicators in Ghana and their impact on welfare, 1980-2000 
Crisis  Main Crisis Indicators  Health Indicators  Education (School 
enrolment) Indicators 
Poverty Incidence 
Indicators  Employment indicators 















·  Trade balance worsened from a 
deficit of  US$36.2 million in 1985 to a 
deficit of US$ 321 million in 1991 
·  Real GDP growth fell from a 
positive value of 6.25% in 1980 to a 
negative value of 4.56% in 1983 
·  Price of Gold fell by 14.5% in 
1987, 21.9% in 1990 and by 9.2% in 
1992 
·  1.2 million Ghanaian emigrant 
workers were expelled from Nigeria in 
1983 
Real GDP of agriculture fell by 7% in 
1983 and by 2% in 1990 
Per capita food availability in 1983 
was 30% lower than in 1974 
Inflation reached a peak of 129% in 
1983 
 
·  Average calorie availability as 
a percentage of requirements fell 
from 88% in late 1970s to 68% in 
the early 1980s 
·  Infant mortality rate increased 
from 86 per 1000 live births in the 
late 1970s to 107/120 per 1000 
live births in the early 1980s 
·  Between 1984-86, Ghanaians 
obtained only 76% of  required 
daily calorie intake 
 
 
·  Growth in gross 
primary school 
enrolment declined from 
5.89% in 1983 to –
3.28% in 1984 and 






·  Real national. Income 
per capita fell by 7.7% 
between 1981-1983  
·  Average earnings of 
workers declined from an 
index of 100 in 1977 to 
21.9% in 1983  
·  Unemployment rate is 
estimated at about 20%  
for 1993 
·  Estimates of 
underemployment for 
1990s ranges between 
64% and 80% of the total 
labor force  
Energy crisis (1982 – 1984) 
Energy crises 1997-1998 
·  Power generation at Akosombo 
fell  by almost 50 percent 
·  Output of electricity and water 
sub-sector  declined 
·  Energy supplies to business and 
industry fell 
 
       
Fiscal Crisis (Huge Budget 
Deficits) 
·  Fiscal Account fell  from a surplus 
of 1.5% of GDP to a deficit of 4.8%,  
5.6% and 4.3% of GDP in 1992, 1993 
and 1995 respectively 
 
    ·  Real income per 
capita fell by 27% between 
1975 and 1983  
·  Public Sector 
employment was cut by 
60% between 1985 and 
1991 
Exchange rate upheavals  ·  Cedi depreciated by 192%  
between 1983 and 1984,  40%  
between 1984 and 1985, 34%  in 
1986/87 and 11%  in 1988/89  
 
       
Increased level of  Debt 
Servicing 
·  Total debt service payments 
increased from US$375 million in 
1990 to US$409 million in 1994  
·  Total government expenditure on 
social services declined from 39.9% in 
1983-91 to 28.1%  in 1992-94 
 
·  Real educational expenditures 
declined by over two-thirds 
between 1975 and 1982  
·  Total government expenditure 
on health decreased from 21%  in 
1990 to 13% in 1994  
·  Rates of immunization were 
low at only 39%  
·  Real educational 
expenditures declined 
by over two-thirds 
between 1975 and 1982  
 
·  36% of Ghanaians 
lived below the poverty line 
between 1987-8  
·  Poverty levels 
increased dramatically in 
Accra from 8.5% in 1987-8 
to 23.9% in 1991-2 
 
   
Sources: ISSER (1994), Appleton & Collier (1990), Hutchful (2002), Appiah, Demery & Laryea-Adjei (2000), Harrigan & Oduro (2000), QDS (June 1998), Wetzel (2000), Canagarajah 
& Mazumdar (1997).   
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In 1983, Ghana began the Economic Stabilization and Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) 
to address distortions in the pricing and exchange systems following years of heavy government 
intervention and massive expansion of the public sector (Aryeetey 1996). The consequences of the 
macroeconomic  policy  adjustments  only  seemed  to  exacerbate  poverty  indicators,  leading  to 
declines in access to health, education and other social services. Low income and labor dependent 
families were hit hard as massive public sector layoffs effected workers, laborers, cleaners, drivers, 
sweepers, messengers and workers in the lower grades of the public service – mostly low paid, 
unskilled jobs. Cornia et. al. 1987 assert that ESAPs often exerted an adverse impact on poorer 
households and vulnerable groups such as women and the unskilled. 
  Between 1987 and 1991, about 50,000 workers were dismissed from public service. Another 
20,000 were dismissed from the Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD - the agency responsible for 
Ghana’s cocoa marketing) with the intention to relocate and redeploy labor within the private 
sector.  During  the  1997-98-power  crisis,  job security was  further threatened as  medium sized 
power  consuming factories  produced  below  planned  output.  Larger  power  consumers  like  the 
Volta Aluminum Company (which consume 50% of total hydropower generated in the country) 
shutdown 3 of its 4 operating pot-lines and dismissed about 38% of its total workforce. Major steel 
mills operated at 50% of their 1997 production levels, losing 30% of their domestic market share 
and meeting only 50% their export demands (Quayson 1998). The mining sector also had its share 
of labor market adjustments, as a result of the financial/commodity market crisis. In 1999, a major 
gold producing company dismissed more than 2,500 workers. 
 
2. Agriculture as a safety net 
 
This study examines what role the agriculture sector played during these crisis. Among the ways 
agriculture can be a safety net or an economic buffer for those losing their jobs in urban areas 
include: (i) the opportunity for relatives that have lost their jobs in urban areas the opportunity to 
come back to the farm and be temporarily employed; and (ii) through direct rural to urban intra-
household cash transfers. Looked at from this perspective, rural family support in times of crises 
can be considered an insurance pay-off for the migrating family member who sent remittances 
home to their rural families. Remittances therefore become the monetary premium that migrated 
household members pay in order to purchase the insurance that will pay off when a major event 
takes place, such as loss of a labor market (Bresciani, 2002).  
  The objective of this paper is to document, assess and characterize the role Ghana’s agriculture 
has played as a safety net when the urban labor market suffered economic shocks. The study 
explores how agriculture influences non-agricultural dependent households. Specific attention is 
given to the implicit value of the informal insurance role that rural households play in supporting 
family  members  who  lose  jobs  acquired  after  migrating  to  urban  areas.  The  paper  analyses 
Ghanaian agriculture’s social security role in the late 1980s and 1990s. This well documented 
period in Ghanaian economic literature, coincides with both natural and macro policy shocks and 
the policy measures taken to cope with the shocks. The study uses the Ghana Living Standards 
Surveys  (GLSS)  2  (1988/89),  GLSS  3  (1991/92)  and  GLSS  4  (1998/1999)  surveys  for  the 
documentation and analysis. The GLSS 4 data is utilized for the remittance function to test the 
social security role of agriculture.  
  The following section discusses labor market adjustments including occupation switches, and 
the role of the state in mitigating the social impact of macroeconomic crises, cataloguing informal 
and state-sponsored safety nets for urban labor markets. Section 4 examines the role of agriculture 
as  a  safety  net.  Evidence  on  rural-urban  migration  and  access  to  formal  private  and  public 
insurance against unemployment and evidence on use of remittances by families are analyzed. 
Section 5 tests, empirically, the social security role of agriculture. Section 6 provides conclusions 
and policy implications for the study.  
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3. Ghana’s macroeconomic shocks: impact on labor  market and available 
  safety nets  
 
The 1984 census reports the national unemployment rate at 3% with an ever lower 1.5% rate in 
certain rural areas (ISSER 1992). The farm-sector has been the largest non-formal employment 
source for Ghanaians. Data indicate that of those with primary education or less, only 14% were 
employed by the public sector, while 75% worked in farming or informal sector occupations. Of 
those with post secondary  or university education, more than 50% had  jobs within the public 
sector (GLSS, 1987-88).  
  Over  the  ESAP  period,  however,  formal  sector  employment  reduced  by  about  60%, 
representing an average annual decrease of 10%, compared with an average 2.3% annual growth 
rate of the labor force (ISSER, 1995). It is estimated that open unemployment was about 20% for 
1993 (ISSER 1994). The jump in unemployment and underemployment rates has been attributed 
to labor market adjustments exacerbated by the ESAP, a programme aimed at addressing the low 
investment rates and the lack of employment growth in the private sector. ESAP envisaged job 
growth through that social security would be extended to those who lost their jobs through an 
expansion in private sector employment, the use of more labor-intensive techniques of production 
with the active involvement of self-employed people and expansion of micro-enterprises.  
  The ESAP period in Ghana in the 1980s, saw periodic but significant reverse migration from 
urban areas back to rural areas (Ewusi 1987; Fosu 1989, 1996; Abdulai 1999) and saw remittances 
from urban to rural households drop significantly. 
  The Programme of Action to Mitigate the Social Cost of Adjustment (PAMSCAD) focused on 
providing vocational skills and jobs for those who had lost work due to cutbacks. These jobs were 
community  based  and  geared  to rehabilitate  and  construct social  and  economic infrastructure, 
generate employment and address needs of vulnerable groups. PAMSCAD created public works 
including food-for work projects, labor-intensive feeder road projects and Public Works Projects. 
The incentive package directed workers toward the agricultural sector, offering them assistance for 
land acquisition, tractor services, farm inputs, as well as extension, credit and technical services 
(Government of Ghana 1999). 
 
Coping with the macroeconomic shocks in Ghana 
When  shocks  occur  in  an  economy,  households  cope  in  a  variety  of  ways,  including  selling 
livestock  or  other assets or  calling  on  support  networks  for transfers and loans (World Bank, 
2001). The state also ensure additional forms of social security provision for the affected labor. 
Households, ex-ante manage risks by diversifying income through their involvement in a variety 
of activities, and also cope with risks through forms of self insurance, (eg. precautionary savings, 
consumption  credits  and  assets  build  up)  and  through  informal  group-based  risk  sharing 
mechanisms (Glewwe and Hall 1998; Eswarn and Kotwal 1989; Dercon 2000).  
  One  potential  safety  net  for  the  informal  sector  is  engagement  in  multiple  occupations. 
According to the GLSS, about 58% of second jobs in Ghana were in agriculture. During the initial 
ESAP  period  many  professionals  and  non-professionals  temporarily  drove  their  cars  as  taxis 
(Hutchful  2002)  after  official  working  hours  as  a  means  of  improving  livelihoods.  In  large 
institutions, workers, particularly women traded on-the-job.  
  Kabeer  (2002)  summarizes  household  assets  and  related  consumer  goods  in  times  of 
retrenchment  which  often  begins  with  property  owned  by  women  –  jewelry  and  household 
utensils. 
  Deaton (1991) describes the how households self insure via asset accumulation. Households 
build assets in good years and deplete them in bad years, although the strategy is fallible when 
there is an overall shock since everybody wants to sell assets at the same time, pushing down 
prices on the supply side (not to mention the weaker demand side). Asset prices will collapse 
affecting consumption that can be purchased with the sale of assets (Dercon 2000). In developing 
economies, common assets include livestock of all forms, savings and loans. 
  In Ghana over the ESAP period, the GLSS surveys provide per capita holdings in livestock for 
1988/89, 1991/92 and 1998/99 survey periods. The trends are summarized in Table 2. 
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Table 2  Est. per-capita number of type of livestock/poultry kept by household 
Per Capita Livestock holdings  Type of Livestock 
(selected)  GLSS 2 (1988/89)  GLSS 3 (1991/92)  GLSS 4 (1998/99) 
Draught Animals  --  3  2 
Cattle (Incl. Cows)  7.1  7  9 
Sheep  5.6  6  1730** 
Goats  5.1  5  2483** 
Pigs  6.4  5  7 
Chickens  14.9  16  260** 
Other Poultry  9.4  10  12 
  Source: GLSS 2, Table 72; GLSS 3, Computed from Table 8.2; GLSS 4, Computed from Table 7.2  (**) These 
figures are not mis-type. 
 
  Livestock (draught animals, cattle, pigs, sheep, goats and chickens) owned by households are 
concentrated in rural areas, particularly the rural savanna and forests. The rural savanna also has 
the majority of the draught animals which are mostly hired out. Table 2 shows that the estimated 
per-capita holdings  of livestock between 1988/89 and 1991/92 were unchanged, implying that 
households in the predominantly rural areas did not dispose off their assets to smooth consumption 
patterns. Comparable per-capita figures in 1998/99 for sheep, goats and chickens surged for all 
households. 
  Between 1991/92 and 1998/99, the proportion of households maintaining savings accounts in 
Accra  fell  from  46%  and  35%.  Other  urban  areas  registered  a  drop  from  36%  and  35% 
respectively.  The  proportion  of  those  in  other  localities  maintaining  savings  accounts  either 
increased or did not change. The proportion of urban households maintaining savings accounts 
dropped significantly, possibly in order to smooth consumption. 
 
Informal social protection schemes 
Ghana has two basic types of informal social protection: the extended family and voluntary or 
compulsory  savings  associations  (Gockel  1996).  One  is  the  extended  family.  For  years,  the 
extended family system has been the primary form of social security as members become old or 
are threatened by economic deprivation, disability or social isolation. Individuals and households 
are protected in times of crisis through making claims for assistance on kin in the form of labor 
transfer  (for  farming),  food  and  shelter  until  the  crisis  subsides;  and  children  provide  needed 
services including fetching water and firewood and generally staying with the needy, especially 
the elderly to run errands or perform other domestic chores, with the elderly who are economically 
inactive, providing home tutelage to the children. 
  A  second  informal  safety  net  system  is  voluntary  and  compulsory  savings  associations 
including  rotating  savings  and  credit  associations  and  credit  unions  --  a  semi-formal 
institutionalized  social  security  system.  These  associations  complement  rather  than  substitute 
social protection mechanisms offered by the extended family system. The extent to which these 
informal social security schemes buffeted the labor dismissed during the Ghanaian economic crisis 
and adjustment period is difficult to quantitatively assess. However, a rural finance study by Bentil 
et al (1988) estimated that saving with informal financial institutions made up about 60% of total 
financial savings in rural Ghana in 1988. Another study of urban market women’s saving behavior 
in Ghana by Aryeetey and Gockel (1990) indicated that about 77% of market women saved with 
informal institutions. However, these non-formal financial institutions played an important role in 
social protection when the state withdrew subsidies, price controls and full employment policies 
(Gockel, 1996).   
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State sponsored safety nets 
Over the ESAP period, the state relied on its pension and social security schemes as well as state-
sponsored social relief programs to buffer the dislocations in the labor market.  
  Table 3 summarizes mean annual amounts of income received by urban and rural households 
from a variety of sources for the 1991/92 (GLSS 3) and 1998/99 (GLSS 4) periods in constant 
1991 prices. In the urban and rural households, mean income of central government state pension 
increased, in real terms, between the 1991/1992 and the 1998/1999 surveys. Social security and 
retirement benefits declined relatively in real terms. Dowry and inheritance income in both the 
rural and urban households increased several fold and was the single most important source of 
income.  
 
Table 3  Mean annual amounts of income received by households from a variety of 
sources, and estimated total miscellaneous income (constant 1991 cedis) 
Mean Household Income  Source of Income 
Urban (Cedis)  Rural (Cedis)  All (Cedis) 
Est. Total Misc. 
Income (Bil Cedis) 
  GLSS 3  GLSS 4  GLSS 3  GLSS 4  GLSS 3  GLSS 4  GLSS 3  GLSS 4 






































Dowry or Inheritance 

































Total   23,400  14332  8,200  8545  13,500  10,673  45  43.4 
   
Source: GLSS 3 (Table 11.3) and GLSS 4 (Table 9.26). Constant 1991, using CPI national.  
 
  Trends in the number of beneficiaries of the different types of benefits provided by a Provident 
Fund Scheme between 1966-1990 show that super-annuation (old age) benefits rank the highest in 
terms  of  numbers  benefiting  while  unemployment  benefits  were  barely  claimed  despite  the 
massive retrenchment of labor over the 1983-1990 period. Gockel (1996) indicates that eligibility 
requirements  for  unemployment  benefit  were  so  stringent  that  hardly  anyone  qualified.  If  the 
applicant received redundancy or severance pay from his former employer then that person did not 
qualify for unemployment benefits. During the labor retrenchment period, employers (mostly the 
state)  were  obliged  to  make  severance  payments  to  workers,  thus  disqualifying  them  for 
unemployment benefits.  
  Four  years  into  the  ESAP,  the  state  provided  social  protection  to  disadvantaged  groups 
including  workers  who  had  lost  their  jobs  through  PAMSCAD.  PAMSCAD,  however,  was 
plagued with implementation problems, and  did not coherently  address project issues. Gender 
differentials  for  comparative  analyses  of  social  and  economic  characteristics  of  the  project 
beneficiaries were not explicitly defined and PAMSCAD targeting was also flawed (Alexander et 
al., 1995).  
 
4.  Economic shocks and agriculture as a safety net  
 
During Ghana’s economic decline, agricultural and rural sector real incomes suffered declines. 
Between 1970-1980, real income agricultural income declined by 72% (Ewusi, 1984). The real 
producer price of a load of cocoa (62.5kg) declined. When the cocoa farmer is compared to the 
average wage earner in the modern (urban) sector, there is a worsening position. From an index of 
100 in 1970, the cocoa farmer’s position dropped to 26.4 in 1980. The cocoa farmer’s relative 
position  weakened  by  73.6%  during  the  1970-1980  period  (Ewusi,  1987).  However,  over  the  
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ESAP period, the relative position of farmers vis-à-vis unskilled workers in the urban (modern) 
sector were restored to their 1970 levels due to labor retrenchment in the modern sector and policy 
re-orientation in favor of agriculture. By 1985-86, the producer price of a load of cocoa (62.5kg) 
and the monthly minimum wage were at the same level. In 1985, the producer price of cocoa was 
¢1,700 per load, compared to a monthly wage rate of ¢1,750. In 1986, the producer price of cocoa 
was ¢2,552 but the monthly minimum wage was ¢2,250. By 1986, the real producer price of cocoa 
and the real monthly minimum wage were on par (Ewusi 1987). Further adjustments in the cocoa 
price led to divergence of rural-urban wage rates.  
  Over the period of massive labor cutbacks, agriculture posted an average real growth rate of 
2.5% compared to 7.3% and 7.6% in services and industry respectively (Table 4). Whilst the 
modern sector (industry in particular) had to cut back on labor as a result of foreign exchange 
shortages and over-valued exchange rates to sustain positive growth rates (compared to the period 
1976-1980), the agricultural sector absorbed the workers who had lost their jobs due to the effect 
of the shocks to post positive growth rates. In contrast to the large labor emigration in the 1970s 
that caused shortages in labor for the agricultural (particularly cocoa) sector and a significant fall 
in agricultural output ceteris paribus, the equally large number of returning migrants of labor in 
the early 1980s was easily absorbed in the agricultural sector. This helped to prevent a sudden 
reduction in living conditions for those who resided or moved into the rural sector. 
 
Table 4  Average sectoral growth rates of Ghana’s economy 
Year  Agriculture  Services  Industry 
1976-1980  4.7  1.2  -5.6 
1984-1993  2.45  7.34  7.64 
1994-2001  3.76  5.26  3.83 
 
 
Source: Computed using data from Ghana Statistical Service (GSS), various issues. 
 
  During  macroeconomic  crisis  period  (in  particular,  1983-1988),  the  agricultural  sector 
provided the majority of revenue needed to support the economy. Export duty on cocoa provided 
the  bulk  of  domestic  revenue  while  agricultural  produce  of  cocoa  contributed  the  largest 
proportion of export revenue in real terms. While agriculture provided the bulk of the revenue 
generation to support the economy during the macroeconomic crises, it did not benefit the most in 
terms of budgetary support in the form of total recurrent and development expenditures, in real 
terms. Thus, the agricultural sector was a net revenue generator, during most of the 1980s, helping 
sustain the fiscal policies of the government during the macroeconomic crises. 
  The  agricultural  sector  also  provided  several  informal  safety  nets.  Ease  of  entry  into 
agricultural  production  with  a  variety  of  unskilled  jobs  and  tasks.  For  the  landless,  there  are 
several tenancy agreements that are very flexible and require very little or hardly any collateral. 
These include the share cropping systems of abunu and abusa. Evidence from the Ghanaian case 
indicates that backyard farming was very common among households especially during periods of 
high cost of food (Hutchful, 2002). Hutchful (2002) further indicates that most urban dwellers 
reactivated  their  rights  to  village  lineage  lands  for  both  subsistence  and  commercial  farming 
“through their remittances and various types of investments”. In certain extreme instances, some 
urban dwellers gave up their wage labor and immigrated to the rural areas. Within the poorer urban 
households, changes in nutrition and diet were means of managing the impact of the crisis. This 
was achieved through a shift from relatively expensive to cheaper food by either substituting meat 
with fish or deleting both meat and fish from their diet (Hutchful 2002). Other strategies included 
skipping one or more meals and in certain instances, some households experimented with new 
food sources even from the wild. The agricultural sector allowed households to draw directly on 
nature and in the reactivation of rural industries utilizing local inputs such as wood and wood 
extracts. 
  Labor in Ghana has seen continued rural to urban migration. However, at the height of Ghana’s 
economic crisis and adjustment in the 1980s, the flow of migration from rural to urban areas  
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decreased and in some periods even reversed. Beaudry and Sowa (1994) provide information that 
relates net migration for different regions and periods in Ghana. 
  Table  5  shows  that  up  to  1970,  net  migration  was  from  the  Central,  Eastern,  Volta  and 
Northern and Upper regions towards Accra, Western and Ashanti regions. However, in the 1980s, 
the pattern of net migration was reversed with destination towards the predominantly agricultural 
regions of the Western, Eastern, Ashanti and the Northern and Upper regions. 
 
Table 5  Net migration flows (percent) 
 
(1) Up to 1970  (2) Up to 1987  (3) 1982 - 1987  REGION 
























































100.0   
Source: Table adapted from Canagarajah and Mazumdar (1997), Table 6.9 
 
  Table  6  provides  data  on  remittances  from  rural  to  urban  households  .  In  real  terms,  for 
1991/92 survey, urban-rural remittances was ¢2 billion whilst rural-urban remittances was ¢ 9 
billion.  By  1998/99  survey,  urban-rural  remittances  were  ¢2.9  billion  whilst  rural-urban 
remittances had increased to ¢26.3 billion.  
 
Table 6  Est. total annual income from remittances of persons (Bil 1991Cedis) 
Urban  Rural  Abroad  Total  Locality 
GLSS 3  GLSS 4  GLSS 3  GLSS 4  GLSS 3  GLSS 4  GLSS 3  GLSS 4 
Urban  18  42.4  2  2.9  16  45.6  35  92.3 
Rural  9  26.3  13  12.2  4  11.9  25  50.3 
Total  27  70.1  15  15.1  20  57.4  60  142.6 
 
 
 Note: Figures are converted to real 1991 cedis using national CPI. Source: GLSS 3 and GLSS 4. 
 
  Although  comparable  figures  in  the  GLSS  in  1987,  1988/89  and  earlier  periods  are  not 
available, the trend from 1991/92 and 1998/99 surveys indicate a sharp reduction in the growth of 
urban-rural remittances compared to the growth in remittances from rural to urban households. It 
is  important  to  note  that  responses  to  the  value  of  total  cash,  food  and  goods  remitted  were 
solicited from the migrant head of household. It is therefore possible to undervalue remittances 
coming from the urban areas and to over value those from the rural household to the urban centers. 
Reverse checks are non existent. 
 
5.  Test of social security role of agriculture in Ghana.  
 
The safety net role of agriculture in Ghana during the economic crises manifests itself in urban-
rural return migration for temporary employment and support from farm family members to urban 
migrants. 
  The farm family support may be seen as an insurance pay-off to migrated family members who 
contributed, through remittances, to  supporting the rural family. Remittances therefore are the 
monetary premium that migrated household members pay in order to insure themselves in case of 
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Theory and evidence 
Evidence on patterns of transfers (remittances) indicates a variety of functions and effects: old-age 
support, providing credit in helping households overcome borrowing constraints and dealing with 
risks, helping finance human capital investment by supporting younger workers who have recently 
left home,  and  help  during illness (Cox  2002).  Remittances  are interpreted  as  repayments  for 
assistance  with  migration or as insurance premiums against  shortfalls in income (Rempel and 
Lobdell,  1978).  Kaufmann  and  Lindauer  (1986)  view  private  transfers  as  the  outcome  of  an 
implicit  social  insurance  contract  among  a  network  of  related  households  with  transfers  to 
temporarily disadvantaged households acting as insurance payments. 
  Both  altruistic  and  self-interested  motives  generate  these  functions  and  effects  (Cox  and 
Jimenez, 1995). Altruism presumes the migrant derives utility from the utility of those left at home 
(Stark,  1991;  Hoddinot,  1992)  so  cares  for  them.  Remittances  therefore  have  an  effect  on 
contributing to equity. Self-interest in sending remittances may be the result of the migrants’: 
aspiration to inherit, maintenance and care of assets left back, intent to return home and thus 
investment  in  assets  that  will  be  covered  later,  and  insurance  against  income  or  employment 
shocks while in the urban sector (Stark, 1991).  
  Stark (1991) attempts to rationalize the flow of remittances as a manifestation of enlightened 
self-interest or tempered altruism. Cox and Jacubson (1989) indicate that even if transfers are 
influenced by both motives, only one pre-dominates in any given instance. 
  Cox and Jimenez (1990) indicate a distinguishing test for altruism and self-interest exchange 
based  on  the  relationship  between  the  recipient  pre-transfer  income  and  the  transfer  amount 
received.  The  altruism  model  predicts  that  it  is  always  negative.  Shortfalls  in  the  recipients’ 
resources, for example, always prompt more generous transfers. But the exchange model admits a 
positive relation between the two variables. Higher income strengthens the bargaining position of 
recipients in exchange so that when their income increases, they can get higher transfers.
1  
  Stark  (1991)  categorizes  the  motives  for  remitting  into  purely  altruistic  or  purely  selfish 
motivations in Botswana for the period 1978-79. Remittances were found to be significant and 
positively related to (a) the level of education with significant evidence for females who invest in 
their young an understanding of subsequent remittance; (b) aspirations to inherit as measured by 
sons who remit to families with larger herds; (c) drought conditions, where the worse the drought, 
the more is remitted. Knowles and Anker (1981) provide analytical evidence for Kenya on the 
characteristics  and  determinants  of  remittance  and  income  transfers.  The  decision  to  make 
transfers is positively and significantly related to income, education, urban residence, male sex, 
migrant status, ownership of a house in the home area (by migrants), a wife residing away, and the 
number of household members other than wives and children residing away. 
 Hoddinott  (1992)  observed  that  though  migrant’s  income  tend  to  influence  remittance  flow 
positively, land holdings and education of the male household head lower the likelihood and level 
of remittances, with education exhibiting a quadratic relationship with the level of remittances. 
Ravallion  and  Dearden  (1988)  find  whilst  transfer  receipts  and  outlays  are  income  inequality 
reducing in rural areas, this is not the case in urban areas. They also find evidence of transfers 
being  targeted  to  disadvantaged  households  such  as  the  sick, elderly  and  for  urban  areas,  the 
unemployed.  Agarwal  and  Horowitz  (2002)  using  household  survey  data  from  Guyana  find 
evidence  to  support  the  altruistic  incentive  to  remit  with  significant  differences  in  remittance 
behavior of multiple and single migrants. 
 
Modeling: approach to the empirical analysis of remittances 
Assuming self-interest is the motivation, the level of remittances is associated with farm and other 
assets such as livestock, land, machinery, ceteris paribus. Most importantly, the average level of 
remittances should also be associated with the riskiness of the migrant’s income. The riskier the 
income, the higher the willing to pay, all else equal. A higher flow of remittances to the farm or in 
other types of productive assets improves the family’s ability to buffer the migrants’ income or 
                                                
1 Cox  and  Jimenez  (1990)  indicate  that  Kaufman  and  Lindauer  (1986)  for  El  Salvador;  Kaufmann  (1982)  for  the 
Phillipines; Ravallion and Dearden (1988) for rural households in Java, and Tomes (1981) for bequest in the United States 
found an inverse relation between these variables whilst Lucas and Stark (1985) for Botswana; Cox (1987) for the US; 
Ravallion and Dearden (1988) for Java and Cox and Jimenez (1989) for Peru find a positive relationship.   
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employment shocks. As such, the migrant is investing in his family as a way to substitute for an 
otherwise absent formal or state-backed unemployment insurance scheme. The part of remittances 
that can be imputed to the payment for an insurance premium are an ex ante implicit valuation of 
the social security role provided by the family. 
  The use of remittance functions in empirical analysis is evident in the works of Knowles and 
Anker  (1981),  Ravallion  and  Dearden  (1988),  Stark  (1991),  Hoddinott  (1992),  Agarwal  and 
Horowitz (2002), among others. Knowles and Anker (1981) estimate two basic models consisting 
of the following: 
P(R>0)    = f (X)                      (1) 
E(R | R>0)  = g (X)                      (2) 
 
where P(R>0)   is the probability that remittances are sent, E(R | R>0) is the expected amount of 
money transferred among households transferring some income and X is a vector of independent 
(economic and socio-economic) variables. The formulation of the dependent variables implies that 
those individuals who did not remit were dropped from the sample. The two separate models, one 
determining the decision to transfer and the other the amount that is transferred, together constitute 
a twin linear probability function. They predict that income earned by the migrant is expected to 
affect transfers positively whilst income earned by household members residing away should have 
a negative effect on remittances. 
  Stark (1991) postulates the following model: 
 
Ri = h (X)                            (3) 
 
where R is the logarithm of monthly remittances and X, (like in Knowles and Anker), is a vector 
of independent variables with various interactive terms. Their model takes note of two estimation 
issues. Firstly, the estimation of a hazard rate to correct for in-sample selection bias and secondly, 
in the absence of data on earnings of absentees, the estimation of earnings equations estimated 
from household data, so that absentees’ earnings could be predicted if they are reported to be 
working, with explanatory variables confined to information known about each absentee. 
Hoddinott (1992) corrects for zero-remittance observations in a specification of remittance flows 
for  Kenyan  rural  household  survey.  Hoddinot  (1992)  sample  selection  corrected  estimation 
involves the following. Let the decision to remit, P (where P=1 if Ri > 0) be a function of observed 
(G) and unobserved (ß) characteristics: 
 
P = P (G, ß)                        (4) 
 
Conditional on P=1, the level of remittances R are a function of observed (X) and unobserved (g) 
characteristics: 
 
R = R (X, g)                        (5) 
 
There is the possible correlation between the two unobserved characteristics (ß,g) if equations (4) 
and (5) were estimated separately that suggest a two step approach. First, estimate a probit for the 
decision to remit: 
 
Pi = b´ Gi + ui                       (6) 
 
From this, compute the inverse Mill’s ratio, ￿ where, 
 
￿ = f (b´ Gi) / ￿ (b´ Gi)                  (7) 
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and  fi  and  ￿i  are  the  density  and  distribution  functions  of  the  standard  normal  distribution 
evaluated at b´G/￿ . The inverse Mill’s ratio is then included as an additional regressor in the level 
equation, conditional on P=1: 
 
Ri = ￿´Xi + ￿￿￿i + vi                   (8) 
 
  From equation (8), there is a direct effect, as captured by ￿, and an indirect effect through the 
inverse Mill’s ratio. Hoddinot (1992) suggests that variables such as migrant’s earnings, migrant’s 
level of education, rural household land holdings and migrant’s role in decision-making on the 
family farm and his intention to return should enter the remittance function.  
A recent work by Agarwal and Horowitz (2002) follows the empirical methodology outlined by 
Hoddinot  (1992;  1994)  that  corrects  for  the  decision  to  remit  as  a  variable  in  the  level  of 
remittance. Agarwal and Horowitz (2002) model however, takes account of the probability of a 




I = r (Ym, Ym
2, ￿)                    (9) 
 
Ym is a first period income of migrant. Ym
2 is a second period unknown income when remittances 
are made and may be high (Ym
1) or low (Ym
2 = Ym
1 – L, L > 0). Ym
2 occurs with a probability ￿ (0 
< ￿ < 1) for a “bad state” and a probability of 1- ￿ for a “good state”. The bad state arises as a 
result  of  sickness,  accident  or  unemployment.  Ym,,  Ym
2,  and  ￿  are  hypothesized  to  influence 
remittance levels positively, negatively and positively, in that order. They also define an implicit 
function for the case of pure altruism as 
 
R
A = (Ym, Yh , ￿I, n, m, x, ￿ )               (10) 
 
where Ym , ￿ are as previously  defined; Yh, ￿I, n, m, x are total  household income (Yh), the 
migrants “altruism weight” towards the i
th household (￿I); the number of non-migrating household 
members (n), additional migrants (m) who remit the household and the amount (x) remitted. By 
their altruistic model, ￿R / ￿Ym >0, ￿R/ ￿Yh < 0, ￿R/ ￿￿I > 0, ￿R/ ￿m < 0, ￿R/ ￿x < 0, ￿R/ ￿n and ￿R/ 
￿￿ are ambiguous. A key testable implication of their altruistic model is the effect of multiple 
migrants upon average remittance levels. Under pure insurance (self-interest) motives, the number 
of other migrants from the same household would not affect own remittance. 
  Agarwal  and Horowitz (2002)  empirical  model  uses  a number  of proxies for some  of  the 
variables outlined in equation (9) and (10). Unemployment rate is used as a proxy for the “bad 
state”  and  un-reported  migrant  income  proxied  by  migrants  socio-economic  characteristics 
including  location  of  remitting  migrant.  Ravallion  and  Dearden  (1988)  also  employ  an 
unemployment variable (a dummy = 1 if head of household is in workforce but out of work in 
previous week and zero otherwise) as an important influence on transfer behavior. 
 
Model Specification of the present study 
The specification for the remittances from migrants to their family’s back home follows that of 
Stark (1991) for Botswana, Hoddinot (1992) and Agarwal and Horowitz (2002). The structure of 
the basic model estimated is: 
 
R = ￿0 + ￿1y + ￿2W + ￿3￿ + ￿4FA + ￿5MA + ￿6 ￿ i + ￿i Xi + ei     (11) 
 
where R is a measure of the level of migrant’s remittance, y is a measure of family’s per capita 
income, W is migrant’s wage or self-employed income, ￿ is a measure of migrant’s unemployment 
risk, FA is family’s assets, MA is migrant’s assets, ￿i is the inverted Mills ratio as an additional 
regressor  and  Xi  is  a  vector  of  individual  and  location  factors  that  bear  on  the  migrant’s 
remittances such as age, educational level and number of other migrants remitting to the same 
household. ￿ and ￿ are estimated parameters and e’s are independent, normally distributed error  
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process.  In  addition,  interactive  terms  of  the  individual  and  location  factors  with  the  other 
variables are explored.  
  For the rural to urban transfers, following from Ravallion and Dearden (1988), the estimated 
econometric model is: 
 
R = b0 + b1y + b2X + b3￿ + ui                 (12) 
 
where variables are as previously defined but specific to household transfer characteristics. 
Whilst  the  Mill’s  inverse  ratio  variable  (￿)  is  estimated  from  equations  (6)  and  (7),  the 
unemployment risks, ￿, is a variable that is not observed and is estimated. Use is made of the labor 
survey  (employment)  component  of  the  GLSS  4.  An  equation  of  the  probability  of  being 
employed, controlling for  known individual characteristics such as age, education,  gender and 
dummies for location, among others, is estimated: 
 
Pi = ￿ + ￿ Xi + r Di                   (13) 
 
where Pi represents the probability of the individual being employed (P=1 when the individual has 
an employment
2 and 0 otherwise) and Xi and Di are the individual characteristics and the dummies, 
respectively. Equation (13) is estimated using the probit model. This estimated equation is used to 
predict each migrant or head of household unemployment risk, ￿ = (1 – Pi), based on their known 
socio-economic characteristics and location. This expected unemployment risk variable represent 
an ex antes measure of the perceived probability of loosing a job in the next period.  
 
Hypothesis tested 
The average level of migrant’s remittance is associated with the riskiness of the migrant’s income. 
The riskier his income, the higher the premium he is willing to pay, ceteris paribus. The migrant’s 
income risks  are associated  with the  unemployment  risk  variable.  The  main hypothesis  tested 
(equation 11), where Ho is the null and Ha the alternative, is: 
 
Ho: ￿3 = 0 
Ha: ￿3 > 0 
 
  The hypothesis is evaluated using the student-t statistic. A rejection of the null hypothesis 
provides a test of the social security hypothesis (that in the absence of formal unemployment 
insurance, the migrant' s insurance towards unemployment risks is increased remittance to rural 
farm family to provide support at times of crisis) at the household level. 
 
Description of the data for the remittance functions 
The analysis of the remittance functions is based on data from the national household standard of 
living survey conducted in Ghana from April 1998 to March 1999 (GLSS 4: 1998/99). This study 
adopts  the  Agarwal  and  Horowitz’s  (2002)  convention  that  household  refers  to  the  migrants 
household of origin, and migrant refers to a household member who is spatially separated from 
his/her household) is adopted. The GLSS 4 data are grouped under different sections and files. The 
various data sets were matched using same household identification number and enumeration area 
number. Since the total sample in the GLSS 4 were matched for the relevant information, it is 
assumed that the final sample utilized for the analysis is representative of the total sample. The 
data set in the GLSS 4 covering households who sent any money or goods in the past 12 months to 
migrated household  members was 2587 (43%)  of the 5985 respondents, whilst from  migrated 
household members to family members back home were 866 (31%) of 2824 respondents after the 
data  matching.  Household  heads  of  migrant  origin  provided  information  on  migrant 
                                                
2 An individual is considered employed if he did some work for profit or family gain in the past seven- (7) days prior to the 
survey. It does not take into account the amount of time spent on that work.  
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characteristics. However, information on migrant age, educational background, length of absence 
from household, and income is not provided. 
 
Results and discussion 
Variable description, their measurement and their moments (mean and standard  deviation) are 
presented in Appendix 1. 
  Appendix 2 presents the probit estimation of the probability of being employed from which the 
probability of being unemployed is estimated. It is a postulated function of personal traits (age, 
square of age and sex), the level of education and location.  
 
Migrant to households  
Table 7 presents the estimated remittance equation of the level of the amount
3 of remittances made 
by migrated family members to their families’ back home. The estimation procedure is the OLS.
4 
 
Table 7  Estimated remittance equation of migrants to households 
Variable description  All Migrants  
(Log REMITT) 
Variable description  All Migrants  
(Log REMITT) 
Constant  3.2151*  Education of head of household   
EMPRISK (￿ )  7.3277***  EDKP  0.4161* 
log (FPCI)  0.3771***  EDMJSS  0.3850* 
log (LAND)  0.1451***  EDSSS  0.293 
log (LAND) x 
DCHILD x SEXCODE 
-0.0886  EDLEARN  -0.0833 
log (MREMIT)  0.1783  Relation of head of household to Migrant 
log (AGE)  -0.1546  DPARENT  -0.3703 
log (AGE) sq.  -0.0274  DSPOUSE  1.1678*** 
DCHILD x SEXCODE  0.5666*  N  252 
SEXCODE  0.6367***  R2(adj)  0.2348 
Location of head of 
household 
  DW  1.9263 
RUSAV  -0.612     
RUCOS  0.3407*     
OTHUR  0.1733     
   
Notes: See Appendix 1 for list of variables, definitions and measurement. *, ** and *** represent significance at 
the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively. Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Table 7, variables that are statistically significant (at either the 1%, 5% and 10% levels) are the 
migrants unemployment risk level, home family’s per capita income and home family’s assets 
(proxied  by  the  amount  of  land  holdings  of  the  household).  Other  variables,  statistically 
significant, are the location of the head of family in the rural coastal area, male migrant, son of the 
head  of  family,  educational  level  of  the  head  of  family  and  spouse  of  the  migrant.  The 
unemployment risk variable
5 is positive and statistically significant at the 1-percent level. The 
                                                
3 It has not been possible to estimate a decision to remit function as only one migrant did not remit after the data structuring 
process. The inverse Mills ratio ((Yi-Xß)/(-Xß)) variable is hence omitted. 
4 The  Ordinary  Least  Squares  (OLS)  procedure  utilized  the  White  Heteroscedasticity-Consistent  Standard  Errors  and 
Covariance procedure provided by the program EVIEWS 
5 The estimated employment equation in Appendix 2 was used. Due to limited information on the migrated family member, 
only gender and location of migrant variables are utilized in the computations.  
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higher the probability of being unemployed, the higher the level of the amount remitted.
6 The 
result tends to support the self-insurance motive of migrants. Migrants amount remitted and per 
capita income of family back home show a positive and highly significant association. Again, this 
observation tends to support the self-insurance motive, as migrants seem not to be remitting more 
to  support  lower  incomes  back  home.  Whilst  family  asset  (land  holdings)  is  positively  and 
significantly related to migrant level of remittance, the interactive term of land and son of head of 
household  is  not statistically significant.  The  aspiration  to inherit  motive  of  remittance  is not 
detected. Sons and male migrants, however, tend to remit more. Remittances from migrants are 
geared more toward spouses. Lower education levels of the head of household do influence the 
amount of remittance whilst age does not. Migrant remittances appear to be targeted, significantly, 
to rural coastal family homes than other locations. The number of other migrants of the same 
household remitting has no significant effect on the average amount remitted. This observation 
also tends to support the self-insurance motive of migrants. 
 
Household to migrant  
Table 8 gives the Probit estimates of the coefficients of equation (6) and OLS estimates of the 
households (urban-urban, rural-urban) remittance function based on equation (12).  
  From Table 8, the decision to remit
7 is dependent (statistically significant at either the 5% or 
1% levels) on per capita income (negative), location of migrated household member, relation of 
migrant to head (positive) and the (un) employment status of the head (negative). The decision to 
remit is influenced positively by the level of education of head of household. The location of head 
is also a significant variable. Age of head of household is not a significant variable in the decision 
to  remit.  The  results  of  the  decision  to  remit  agree  well  with  Agarwal  and  Horowitz  (2002) 
although their data is for migrants to households. 
  Table 8 also reports the estimation for the level of the amount of remittances from heads of 
households to migrated family members. 
The  estimation  procedure  was  ordinary  least  squares  (OLS).  The  results  are  for  the  total 
household. All rural and all urban household samples are included for comparison. 
The results in Table 8 for the total household sample indicates that household per capita income 
(total expenditures per capita), gender of head, level of education of head, location of migrant 
(Accra and Kumasi), child of head and whether child is a male, spouse of head (wife), other 
relatives  of  the  head  and  the  unemployment  probability  of  head  of  migrants  household  are 
statistically significant mainly at the 5% and 1% levels.    
In  contrast  to  the  decision to  remit function,  income  is  a  positive  and  statistically  significant 
determinant of the amount remitted. Age of head of household is not a significant determinant of 
the amount remitted. Again, location of migrant (Accra) has a negative and statistically significant 
(10%) influence on the amount remitted. 
 
                                                
6 Location of the migrant (as a proxy for migrant income) was included in the function but was all negative and statistically 
insignificant  hence  dropped  from  the  analysis.  We  attribute  the  insignificant  parameter  estimates  to  a  possible  high 
correlation between these variables and the unemployment risk variable. 
7 Estimation of the parameters of the decision to remit function utilized the Maximum likelihood Probit procedure. From 
the structured data, the proportion of heads of households actually remitting was 97.3% of all the household heads. In the 
estimation, however,  given  missing information  on  other  characteristics of  the  head  of  household,  only  two  (2) non-
remitting heads of households were captured Hence the decision to remit was estimated for only the total sample. The 
corresponding computed inverse Mills ratio was dropped from the analysis.  
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Table 8  Estimates of the decision to remit by heads of households and heads of 
household remittances to migrants 
Dependent variable:  DUMREMIT      Log (TOTREMIT) 
Variable   






All Urban  
Households 
Constant    72.6920***  3.0015***  2.6652***  4.4234*** 
log (PCI)    -3.9780***  0.6188***  0.6217***  0.6018*** 
log (AGE)    -1.4665  0.0490  0.0710  -0.1106 
SEXHH    10.4087***  0.2079***  0.2882***  -0.0197 
Dummy: where migrant live         
  Dlive1  ---  ---  ---  --- 
  Dlive2  -2.3460***  -0.1633*  0.0022  -0.2833** 
  Dlive3  7.8123***  0.2001**  0.1932  0.3829** 
  Dlive4  ---  -0.0314  -0.1780  0.3016 
  Dlive5  ---  -0.4297  -0.5136  -0.2679 
  Dlive6  ---  ---  0.0463  --- 
  Dlive7  6.7187***  ---  0.1376  0.0238 
DCHILD    9.9390***  0.2490***  0.3003***  0.2122 
DCHILD x DSEXMIGM  ---  0.2429**  0.1478  0.4773** 
DSPOUSE    ---  0.6544***  0.7832***  0.3522 
DKIN    ---  -0.2633***  -0.2639***  -0.2159* 
Education of Head of Household 
   
EDKP    ---  0.0609  0.0289  0.1300 
EDMJSS    11.9888***  ---  ---  --- 
EDSSS    8.8353***  0.1124  0.0363  0.1337 
EDHIGH     3.9361**  0.2999  0.1270  0.2630 
EDLEARN     9.8941***  0.2759**  0.2988*  0.2396 
Location of Head of Household     
ACCRA     ---       
RUCOS    4.1670***       
RUFOR    -5.5102***       
RUSAV    ---       
OTHUR    5.4983***       
EMPRISK (￿ )  -29.8937***  -2.2179**  -1.426  -6.9826*** 
N   obs=1 (1922)  Obs= 0 (2)  1918  1155  763 
Log Likelihood  -3.4233       
Restricted LogL  -15.737       
LR Statistic (15 df)  24.6273       
Probability (LR stat)  0.0552       
McFadden R2  0.7825       
R2(adj)      0.175  0.153  0.176 
DW      1.620  1.694  1.556 
F-stat      26.47  12.61  10.59 
Prob (F-stat)    0.000***  0.000***  0.000*** 
   
Notes: See Appendix 1 for variable definition and measurement. 1. The base category for education is EDNO. 
That for where migrant live is DLIVE8. 2. *, ** and *** represent significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels 
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The implications derived from the results of the household remittance equation are that: 
(a)   Per  capita  income  is  a  positive  and  a  major  determinant  of  the  level  of  amount  of 
remittances sent. The estimated marginal utility of income is inelastic, on the average 
(approximately 0.61), for all households and all locations. 
(b)  The location  of migrated family  member (Accra and Kumasi, in particular) receiving 
transfers is a major determinant of the amount transferred. This reflects (rural) household 
transfers to migrated household members temporarily affected by (economic) crises in the 
major cities, ceteris paribus. 
(c)  Remittances to child of head, particularly to sons and spouse of head (wife), appear to be 
a  motive  in  determining  the  level  of  amount  remitted.  Other  relatives  of  the  head 
(brothers and sisters) receive significantly less (negative) of the amounts remitted. 
(d)  The unemployment variable is a statistically significant variable in explaining the levels 
of the amount remitted. The lower the probability of being unemployed, the higher the 
probability  of  remitting  higher  amounts,  ceteris  paribus.  See  Ravallion  and  Dearden 
(1988).  If  the  remittance  motivation  by  the  migrant  is  to  insure  against  loss  of 
employment through increased remittances and be able to fall back on the household in 
times of crisis then the household would have to invest its income, ceteris paribus, on its 
assets to accumulate resources to pay out the indemnity in the event that the insurance is 
triggered. 
(e)  Education of the head of household is not a major determinant of the levels of amount 
remitted, although heads of households with vocational skills influence the decision to 
remit and level of amounts remitted. 
(f)  Age of head of household is not a major determinant in the remittance function. 
 
  In summary, similar sets of factors determine remittances from rural and urban households to 
migrated family  members  in the  urban areas  (Accra  and  Kumasi).  These  remittances seem  to 
redistribute income (altruistic motive) to the spouses and children in the urban areas but not to 
other relatives. 
 
6.  Conclusion and policy implications 
 
The impact of the macroeconomic crises and remedial policy induced several dislocations in the 
labor market. Thousands of formal sector employees were dismissed, increasing unemployment. 
Job switching from formal to informal sector activities increased. The dismissed workers were 
directed specifically into the agricultural sector. The period also saw significant reverse migration 
flows from urban (non-agricultural) back to rural (agricultural) areas. Several strategies for coping 
with  the  macro-crisis  were  initiated.  The  state  provided  formal  pension  and  social  security 
schemes and social relief programs to buffer dislocations in the labor market. The extended family 
system and voluntary or compulsory (savings) associations provided informal social protection. 
The agricultural sector acted as a safety net and buffer for non-agricultural dependent households 
in  the  urban  and  rural  areas  by  providing  migrated  relatives  who  lost  their  jobs  with  the 
opportunity to come back to the farm for temporary employment and the provision of direct intra-
households transfer from rural to urban households. 
  The  range  of  roles  that  agriculture  played  in  the  context  of  Ghana’s  socio-economic 
development  over  the  macro-crises  (principally  economic  growth  and  food  security  roles)  are 
widely perceived as the fundamental contributions of agriculture. One of the more important roles 
played by the agricultural sector is as a safety net. . Empirical evidence shows that the rural farm 
family served as migrants’ insurance towards unemployment in the absence of formal insurance.  
  The findings have important policy implications. The rural household support system is an 
addition function played by the rural sector in its capacity of complementing formal social security 
markets. Agriculture (rural households) is not just a source of food, employment, and income and 
of labor supply. Helping the rural sector reduce aggregate risks in income through increased rural 
activity diversification can enhance the existence and effectiveness of  this positive externality 
whereby agriculture (the rural sector) engages in unemployment risk sharing scheme. As rural 
household  per  capita  income  increases,  remittances  from  migrants  increases  (the  informal  
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insurance premiums goes up, increasing investment funds at the rural level) and remittances to 
migrated household members to cushion economic effects also increases. The policy focus must 
therefore emphasize on rural infrastructure improvements (roads, electricity, education, and health) 
and rural initiatives that can bring the hither-to-fore production of non-tradables at the rural areas 
more into the domestic and international markets. These are issues government policies could 
address  to  enhance  the  role  of  agriculture  in  mitigating  macro-shocks  in  an  economy  at  the 
household level.  
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APPENDIX 1: Variable definitions, means and standard deviations 
 
(A)  Probability of being Employed Data Set variables 
Variable  Variable definition and measurement  mean  std. 
deviation 
EMPLOY  Dummy=1 if individual did some work for profit or family gain in 
the past seven (7) days and zero (0) otherwise 
0.8775  0.3279 
AGEY  Age of respondents in years  34.9145  13.3250 
SEX  Dummy for Gender of respondents: Male =1, zero (0) otherwise  0.4259  0.4955 
RUFOR  Dummy for location of respondent in the rural forest area.  The 
locations are coded from the CLUSTER code in the GLSS 4 data. 
RUFOR =1, else zero (0) 
0.3653  0.4816 
RUCOS  Dummy for location of respondent in the rural coastal area.  The 
locations are coded from the CLUSTER code in the GLSS 4 data. 
RUCOS =1, else zero (0) 
0.1421  0.3492 
RUSAV  Dummy for location of respondent in the rural savanna area.  The 
locations are coded from the CLUSTER code in the GLSS 4 data. 
RUSAV =1, else zero (0) 
0.1266  0.3326 
OTHUR  Dummy for location of respondent in other urban areas.  The 
locations are coded from the CLUSTER code in the GLSS 4 data. 
OTHUR =1, else zero (0) 
0.2612  0.4393 
ACCRA  Dummy for location of respondent in the Accra area. The locations 
are coded from the CLUSTER code in the GLSS 4 data. ACCRA 
=1, else zero (0) 
0.1048  0.3063 
EDNO  Dummy for no education/other of respondent. EDNO =1, else zero 
(0). 
0.1003  0.3004 
EDKP  Dummy, kindergarten and primary education of respondent.  EDKP 
=1, else zero (0). 
0.3439  0.4751 
EDMJSS  Dummy, Middle and JSS education of respondent. EDMJSS =1, else 
zero (0). 
0.4216  0.4939 
EDSSS  Dummy, SSS/GCE-O/A level education of respondent.  EDSSS =1, 
else zero (0). 
0.0659  0.2481 
EDHIGH  Dummy, tertiary (Univ., Poly.) education of respondent.  EDHIGH 
=1, else zero (0) 
0.0139  0.1171 
EDLEARN  Dummy, vocational (teacher training, nursing, etc) education of 
respondent. EDLEARN =1, else zero (0). 
0.0545  0.2270 
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(B)  Migrant to Household Data Set variables 
Variable  Variable definition and measurement  mean  std. 
deviation 
REMITT  Average total value of remittances (cash and kind) of migrants to 
the same household (totremit/mremit) 
204195.5  580236.2 
TOTREMIT  Total value of remittances (cash and kind) of migrants to the same 
household 
330462.6  841989 
MREMIT  Total number of migrants remitting to the same Household  1.713933  1.0930 
EMPRISK  Probability of being unemployed variable (see text for 
computation procedure) for migrant 
0.3891  0.0767 
FPCI  Per-capita total expenditure (value) of family household as a proxy 
for per-capita income of household 
1052152  846494 
LAND   Total family land holdings in hectares  10.7281  50.9873 
RUSAV  Dummy for location of head of household in the rural Savanna 
area. RUSAV =1, else zero (0) 
0.0497  0.2175 
RUCOS  Dummy for location of head of household in the rural coastal area. 
RUCOS =1, else zero (0) 
0.2370  0.4255 
OTHUR  Dummy for location of head of household in other urban area. 
OTHUR =1, else zero (0) 
0.1665  0.3727 
EDKP  Dummy, kindergarten and primary education of head of 
household. EDKP =1, else zero (0).   
0.4098  0.4923 
EDMJSS  Dummy, Middle and JSS education of head of Household. 
EDMJSS =1, else zero (0). 
0.3940  0.4890 
EDSSS  Dummy, SSS/GCE-O/A level education of head of Household. 
EDSSS =1, else zero (0). 
0.0427  0.2028 
EDLEARN  Dummy, vocational (teacher training, nursing, etc) education of  
head. EDLEARN =1, else zero (0). 
0.0396  0.1951 
SEXCODE  Dummy for Gender of migrant: Male =1, zero (0) Otherwise    0.5833  0.4933 
CHILD  Dummy =1,  if migrant is child of head of household  0.2687  0.4435 
DPARENT  Dummy =1, if head of household is parent of migrant  0.0560  0.2300 
DSPOUSE  Dummy =1, if migrant is spouse of head of household  0.0485  0.2150 
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(C)  Household to Migrant Data Set variables 
Variable  Variable definition and measurement  mean  std. 
deviation 
DUMREMIT  Decision to remit. Dummy =1, if household remit and zero (0) 
otherwise 
0.9694  0.1722 
TOTREMIT  Total value of remittances (cash and kind) of households to 
migrants 
291935.8  647040 
PCI  Per-capita total expenditure (value) of family household  
as a proxy for per-capita income of household 
1408951  1348235 
AGE  Age in years of head of household  43.6718  14.9278 
EMPRISK  Probability of being unemployed variable (see text for 
computation procedure) for head of household 
0.0886  0.0487 
EDMJSS  Dummy, Middle and JSS education of head of household 
EDMJSS =1, else zero (0). 
0.3974  0.4895 
EDSSS  Dummy, SSS/GCE-O/A level education of head of 
Household. EDSSS =1, else zero (0). 
0.0745  0.2626 
EDHIGH  Dummy, tertiary (Univ., Poly.) education of head of 
Household. EDHIGH =1, else zero (0). 
0.0191  0.1369 
EDLEARN  Dummy, vocational (teacher training, nursing, etc) education 
of  head. EDLEARN =1, else zero (0). 
0.0652  0.2469 
SEXHH  Dummy for Gender of head of household: Male =1, zero (0) 
otherwise 
0.7109  0.4535 
DCHILD  Dummy =1,  if migrant is child of head of household  0.2423  0.4286 
DKIN  Dummy =1, if sister/brother of head of household  0.1663  0.3724 
DSPOUSE  Dummy =1, if spouse of head of household  0.0324  0.1772 
DSEXMIGM  Dummy =1, if migrant is Male  0.3473  0.4762 
RUFOR  Dummy for location of head of household in the rural forest 
area. RUFOR =1, else zero (0) 
0.4237  0.4942 
RUCOS  Dummy for location of head of household in the rural coastal 
area. RUCOS =1, else zero (0)   
0.1648  0.3710 
OTHUR  Dummy for location of head of household in the other urban 
area. OTHUR =1, else zero (0) 
0.2470  0.4314 
DLIVE1  Dummy =1, if migrant is in the same village/town as Head of 
household, else zero 
0.1490  0.3562 
DLIVE2  Dummy =1, if migrant lives in Accra area, else zero    0.1319  0.3384 
DLIVE3  Dummy =1, if migrant lives in Kumasi area, else zero  0.0876  0.2828 
DLIVE4  Dummy =1, if migrant lives in Sek’di/Tak’di area, else zero  0.0163  0.1268 
DLIVE5  Dummy =1, if migrant lives in Tamale area, else zero  0.0076  0.0867 
DLIVE6  Dummy =1, if migrant lives in other urban area, else zero  0.3024  0.4594 
DLIVE7  Dummy =1, if migrant lives in rural area, else zero  0.2908  0.4542 
DLIVE8  Dummy =1, if migrant lives abroad/other, else zero  0.0143  0.1189 
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Maximum Likelihood-Binary Probit Estimation
8 of the Probability of being Employed 
Dependent variable = EMPLOY 
Variable  Coefficient  Standard error  z-statistic  Prob 
Constant  -0.2144  0.1691  -1.2680  0.2048 
Personal traits:         
AGEY  0.0456  0.0078  5.8295***  0.0000 
AGEY sq  -0.0005  0.0001  -4.9083***  0.0000 
SEX  0.2312  0.0526  4.3964***  0.0000 
Education:         
EDHIGH  0.1236  0.2531  0.4885  0.6252 
EDSSS  0.0673  0.1346  0.4999  0.6172 
EDKP  -0.0384  0.0878  -0.4378  0.6616 
EDLEARN  -0.0178  0.1407  -0.1262  0.8996 
EDMJSS  -0.0505  0.0889  -0.5680  0.5700 
Location:         
RUFOR  0.5277  0.0772  6.8366***  0.0000 
RUCOS  0.4848   0.0919   5.2757***  0.0000 
OTHUR  0.3946   0.0806  4.8956***  0.0000 
ACCRA  0.4471  0.1049  4.2619***  0.0000 
N 4388, LR Statistic (12 df)  116.05, Log Likelihood -1574.69, Probability (LR stat) 0.0000, 
Restricted LogL -1632.72, McFadden R
2 0.0355 
_______________________________________________________________________________
Notes: See Appendix 2 for definition of variables and their measurement 
1.  The base category for education is EDNO. That of location is RUSAV. 
*, ** and *** represent significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively. 
 
 
                                                
8 The estimation procedure used the Huber/White Quasi-Maximum Likelihood.  
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